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Two connected studies examine how universalist and particularist views of the Holocaust influence Israeli Jews’ attitudes toward asylum seekers. 
Study 1 (N = 500) investigated the degree to which universalist and particularist perceptions of the “lessons” of the Holocaust correlate with 
exclusionist views toward asylum seekers. It was found that a universalist perception of the “lessons” of the Holocaust was negatively related to 
exclusionist attitudes, and a particularist perception positively related to exclusionist attitudes—even after controlling for religiosity and political 
affiliation. Study 2 comprised three survey experiments (N = 298, 280, and 320, respectively) investigating whether presentation of universalist 
versus particularist texts about the Holocaust would impact exclusionist attitudes. It was found that exposure to a universalist text reduced 
negative attitudes toward asylum seekers and increased support for treating wounded Syrians in Israeli hospitals. Exposure to a particularist did 
not increase exclusionist attitudes. 
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In his 2015 speech marking the first Day of Remembrance 
for Refugees and Expellees, German President Joachim Gauck 
compared the post–World War II displacement of Germans to 
the current African refugee crisis, declaring that: “Seventy years 
ago, a poor and ruined Germany managed to integrate millions 
of refugees. Let us not think ourselves capable of too little to-
day …” (Berlin, May 20, 2015). Such mobilization of history 
for current political purposes has become common practice. 
Collective memory—the transmission of social meaning from a 
 
@ Gal Ariely: galariel@bgu.ac.il 
group’s historical past—plays a vital role in “containing” the 
meaning attributed to the nation (Reicher and Hopkins 2001). 
As such, it forms a significant symbolic resource, frequently 
being exploited by political actors to legitimize particular polit-
ical goals (Liu, Sibley, and Huang 2014).  
Several studies have demonstrated how collective memory 
influences contemporary political issues and public opinion 
(Canetti et al. 2018; Hanke et al. 2018; Hirschberger et al. 
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2017; Kurtiş, Adams, and Yellow Bird 2010; Kus, Ward, and 
Liu 2014; Mols and Jetten 2014; Schori‐Eyal, Halperin, and 
Bar‐Tal 2014; Schori-Eyal et al. 2017; Sibley and Liu, 2012). 
While the importance of collective memory is generally 
acknowledged the interpretation and framing of historical 
events for current political purposes remains fiercely debated. 
Politicians, statesmen and -women, and public figures fre-
quently enlist collective memory of past events in the service 
of their political agendas. Given that different players and 
groups frame particular historical events in different and at 
times conflicting ways (Liu and Hilton 2005; Zerubavel 1996), 
the interpretation and relevance of historical events and figures 
is contested.  
Although the role collective memory plays in shaping atti-
tudes toward current issues is widely acknowledged, the differ-
ence between a priori perception of the meaning of a historical 
event and the way in which it is represented has been largely 
neglected. Public belief that a historical event is relevant to a 
current state of affairs is not always consistent with citizens’ 
responses to its political framing. Many Germans, for example, 
believe that WWII legacy imposes upon them an obligation to 
help refugees. Liberal and left-wing Germans may thus agree 
with President Joachim Gauck’s use of history to justify a policy 
of accepting asylum seekers. Members of the Alternative für 
Deutschland party or the Pegida movement, on the other hand, 
are more likely to violently object to such a line of argument. 
The fact that people recognize an event in their country’s his-
tory as teaching important “lessons,” in other words, does not 
necessarily mean that they will all agree with a particular fram-
ing of it in justification of current policy.  
In this study, we analyze the extent to which both a priori 
perceptions of historical events and their variant representa-
tions affects public attitudes. Specifically, we examine univer-
salist and particularist readings of the Holocaust and the way 
in which these influence attitudes toward asylum seekers 
amongst the Israeli Jewish populace.  
For many years, the Holocaust was perceived and portrayed 
within the Jewish world as a unique, incomparable genocide 
particular to the Jewish people. Over the years, alongside this 
particularistic view, a universalistic approach also developed. 
According to the a universalistic approach, it is a pan-human 
legacy, with ramifications for humanity as a whole. Rather than 
focusing specifically on the Jewish perspective and “lessons” 
to be drawn from it, many draw more universalist “lessons” 
from it, or embrace both views (Auron 2012; Klar, Schori‐Eyal, 
and Klar 2013). Universalist and particularist framings of the 
Holocaust also prompt disparate responses to current events. 
When the Holocaust is framed in universal terms, it tends to 
be mobilized in support of universal goals; when it is framed in 
particularist fashion, it is more often pressed into the service 
of particularist objectives.  
In order to address these two issues—the lessons drawn from 
a historical event and its framing for current political pur-
poses—as distinct phenomena, we conducted two studies. In 
Study 1, we examined the extent to which universalist/partic-
ularist “lessons” Israeli Jews draw from the Holocaust correlate 
with exclusionist views toward asylum seekers, while control-
ling for alternative explanations. In Study 2, we conducted 
three survey experiments to analyze how universalist/particu-
larist representations of the Holocaust impact Israeli Jews’ at-
titudes toward African asylum seekers (Studies 2a and 2b) and 
the treatment of Syrian casualties in Israeli hospitals (Study 2c 
[universalist only]). Hereby, we sought to determine whether 
and how people’s a priori perceptions of the Holocaust corre-
late with their reaction to its universalist/particularist framing. 
 
1. Perceptions of the Past, Its Representation, and 
Contemporary Political Issues 
In the wake of Maurice Halbwachs’ conceptualization of col-
lective memory (1992 [1941]) as widely-shared general 
knowledge of past events that is not necessarily based on per-
sonal experience, collective memory has come to signify the 
transmission of the meaning a group attributes to its unique 
historical past. Over the years, collective memory has been ex-
plored across a variety of disciplines and in a number of frame-
works (Misztal 2003), including its relation to nationhood 
and/or intergroup relations (for example Allpress et al. 2010; 
Branscombe et al. 2015; Canetti et al. 2018; Hammack 2001; 
Hilton and Liu 2008; Hirschberger et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2014; 
Pennebaker, Páez, and Rimé 2013; Rees, Allpress, and Brown 
2013; Vollhardt 2013; Wohl and Branscombe 2005). It is now 
commonly accepted that collective memory can be mobilized 
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to imbue current political and social issues with specific mean-
ing. Studies of groups involved in traumatic events (both as 
victims and perpetrators) demonstrate that the way in which 
such events are framed is likely to affect the type of response. 
Wohl and Branscombe’s research (2005), for example, has 
shown that when the Holocaust is framed as a general human 
phenomenon rather than a uniquely German-Jewish experi-
ence, people were inclined to judge the perpetrators less 
harshly (see also Vollhardt 2013). Bilewicz and Jaworska’s 
(2013) findings similarly indicate that the way in which the role 
played by Poles during the Holocaust is portrayed changes the 
way in which Polish students regard Jews and, to a certain de-
gree, Jewish Israeli students’ views of Poles. In a different con-
text, Kurtiş, Adams, and Yellow Bird (2010) found that diver-
gent framings of the American Thanksgiving holiday affected 
the way in which the respondents perceived national glorifica-
tion. Studies conducted in the context of the Israeli-Arab con-
flict produced comparable findings (Bar-Tal 2013; Halperin 
and Bar-Tal 2011; Hirschberger et al. 2017; Schori‐Eyal et al. 
2014; Schori-Eyal et al. 2017). Evoking the memory of the 
Holocaust, for example, increases Jews’ militancy and reduces 
support for compromises designed to bring about peace (Can-
etti et al. 2018). 
Two insights can be drawn from the social-psychological 
studies of collective memory. Firstly, collective memory has an 
important impact on intergroup relations, serving as a powerful 
source of mobilization. Secondly, the influence it exerts is com-
plex, the same historical event being amenable to diverse in-
terpretations and the drawing of disparate, even conflicting, 
“historical lessons.” The social-psychological approach fo-
cuses on the identity of an entire group—generally a national 
or ethnic community. This accords with Hilton and Liu’s defini-
tion of the historical charter as “a widely shared and iconic 
representation where selective elements of group history, its 
causes, and consequences have been elaborated into a quasi-
legal form that gives moral and sometimes legal implications 
for group action” (2008, 351). While this all-inclusive ap-
proach to group identity is pertinent for the study of intergroup 
relations and identity, however, it also tends to bias our under-
standing of the effects of collective memory—the latter being 
an arena of dispute.  
Sociological accounts of collective memory highlight its con-
troversial aspects. Forming an important symbolic resource for 
legitimizing political goals and political mobilization, it is not 
necessarily either an accurate or a static representation of the 
past. It is frequently enlisted in the service of specific goals. 
The same historical event can be adduced in different ways by 
diverse communities. The implications or “lessons” drawn for 
current political situations can thus diverge significantly 
(Misztal 2003; Zerubavel 1996). Studies of national ceremo-
nies—the primary transmitter of collective memory—reveal, for 
example, that national rituals elicit dissimilar responses 
amongst disparate groups, the meaning attributed to national 
days varying amongst different segments of society (Coop-
mans et al. 2015; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Schuman, 
Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Vinokur 2003).  
The understanding and use of collective memory frequently 
follows political divides (Hepworth 2017). In the dispute over 
the most appropriate way to commemorate the traumatic past 
in their countries, leftists in Germany and Spain, for example, 
are more likely to hold their country responsible for wrongdoing 
and rightists to defend the national past. 
 
2. The Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Israel, 
Asylum Seekers, and Dissimilar Interpretations 
Although the number of Holocaust survivors is rapidly dwin-
dling in Israel, the collective memory of the Holocaust remains 
vivid (Feldman 2013; Lazar et al. 2004; Zertal 2005). Two di-
vergent interpretations are prevalent in Israel: particularist and 
universalist (Klar, Schori‐Eyal, and Klar 2013; Rinkevich-Pave 
2008). The former regards the Holocaust as leading directly to 
the establishment of Israel in 1948: a strong and independent 
state is the sole way of ensuring Jewish survival. Accentuating 
the need for self-reliance, this attitude is skeptical of universal 
norms—which failed to save Jewish lives during WWII (Zertal 
2005, 4). In the most comprehensive investigation of the 
memory of the Holocaust in Israeli society to date, Canetti et 
al. (2018) found that exposure to the rituals of Holocaust Re-
membrance Day was associated with greater support for inter-
group violence, mediated by higher levels of national identifi-
cation.  
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The universalist perception focuses on the moral lessons of 
the Holocaust—primarily the obligation to be neither perpetra-
tor nor passive bystander (Klar et al. 2013). Although less 
dominant, this representation is also occasionally used to le-
gitimize policy (Auron 2012)—the fight for the recognition of 
refugees from conflict regions such as Vietnam, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, for example (Herzog 2009). It has been conspicuous 
for its absence in the debates over the recent influx of asylum 
seekers from Africa, however, whose numbers have now 
reached nearly sixty thousand—primarily Eritreans and Suda-
nese crossing into Israel from Egypt. While a very small number 
of Darfurians have been granted asylum, the current Israeli 
government policy toward African asylum seekers is in general 
one of detention and deportation. Refusing to recognize them 
as refugees, the official discourse defines them as “infiltrators” 
that are just seeking jobs in Israel (Duman 2015). This repre-
sentation promotes exclusionist attitudes (Hochman 2015), 
levels of which are already relatively high in Israel (Hercowitz-
Amir, Raijman, and Davidov, 2017). While some NGOs and 
asylum seekers’ representatives have cited the Holocaust in 
criticizing the government’s policy (Yacobi 2011), this appeal 
has had little effect on Israeli exclusionist policy. As Kalir ob-
serves, the “Israeli national narrative in seeing the injustice 
that has been done to Jews historically as the justification for 
a Jewish state that guarantees dignified citizenship primarily 
for Jews. (2015, 594–95). The universalist understanding of 
the Holocaust thus appears to have had little influence on the 
policy adopted toward asylum seekers.  
 
3. The Current Research 
In light of the notion that interpretations of collective memory 
influence segments of society diversely, this study focuses on 
how differential framings impact attitudes toward current polit-
ical issues. It thus explores (a) a priori perceptions of the Hol-
ocaust and the “lessons” people draw from it, and (b) re-
sponses to universalist/particularist representations of the 
Holocaust.  
In order to address these two issues, the research was di-
vided into two sections. In Study 1, we examined the extent to 
which the universalist/particularist “lessons” Israeli Jews draw 
from the Holocaust correlate with exclusionist views toward 
asylum seekers, controlling for religiosity, political attitudes, 
national identification, and nationalism. Cross-sectional in de-
sign, this study’s power to analyze representations of collective 
memory was limited. We therefore followed it up with three sur-
vey experiments designed to discover whether universal-
ist/particularist representations of the Holocaust per se af-
fected attitudes toward asylum seekers (Studies 2a and 2b) 
and the treatment of Syrian casualties in Israeli hospitals 
(Study 2c [universalist only]). 
 
4. Study 1: The “Lessons” Drawn from the Holocaust and 
Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers—A Correlational Study 
In Study 1 we assess whether existing beliefs, reflected in 
the drawing of universalist/particularist “lessons” from the Hol-
ocaust, correlate with attitudes toward asylum seekers, con-
trolling for alternative explanations. 
 
4.1. Participants 
While studies of collective memory traditionally adopt social-
psychology experimental approaches that involve sampling 
students in labs, we sought a more diverse and non-lab sam-
ple. We recruited participants via an online panel that con-
ducted web-based surveys. Completing an online question-
naire in exchange for a sum equivalent to US $2, the partici-
pants were invited to take part in a “study about social and 
political issues”; neither the Holocaust nor asylum seekers 
were mentioned directly.  
Only Israeli Jews were recruited. While the sample was het-
erogeneous (N = 500; 50.4% women; mean age 41; 14% born 
outside Israel; 55% secular; 30% high-school education or 
less), it was not a probability sample. Nor should it be regarded 
as a representative sample of Jews in Israel. These limitations 
notwithstanding, online panels possess two advantages. 
Firstly, the evidence indicates that, despite demographic dif-
ferences, online panel and population-based survey experi-
ments yield similar findings (Revilla et al. 2015; Weinberg, 
Freese, and McElhattan 2014). Attention levels and socially-
desirable responses also differ only minimally between lab and 
online settings (Clifford and Jerit 2014). Secondly, panels en-
able a broader set of participants than those available under 
lab conditions. 
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The dependent variable—“endorsing an exclusionist policy 
toward asylum seekers”—was measured using four items 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disa-
gree, to 7 = strongly agree): (a) “Israel should deport asylum 
seekers”; (b) “Israel should ignore asylum seekers’ applica-
tions”; (c) “While their requests are being considered, asylum 
seekers should be kept in detention camps”; and (d) “Israel 
should be generous to asylum seekers” (reverse coding). The 
items loaded on a single factor that accounted for 67% of the 
variance (α = .83). The primary independent variables—univer-
salist and particularist “lessons” of the Holocaust—were 
adopted from Rinkevich-Pave (2008). They were tested using 
eight items designed to represent universalist and particularist 
lessons. Table 1 present the results of the exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) of these items. 
The EFA yielded two factors with clear distinctions within the 
factor loadings (third factor eigenvalue = 0.66). The very weak 
intercorrelation (r = .09) indicated that the factors were almost 
orthogonal. While the particularist scale (M = 5.76; SD = 1.21) 
enjoyed greater support than the universalist scale (M = 5.02; 
SD = 1.32), both were highly endorsed in the 1–7 range. The 
analysis also included a set of variables commonly employed 
to determine attitudes toward minorities—socio-demographic 
background (age, gender, education, SES), religiosity, political 
identification, national identification, and nationalism (see Ap-
pendix A).  
The correlations between the universalist and particularist 
“lessons,” the key socio-demographic variables, and political 
ideology demonstrate the distribution of attitudes amongst di-
verse segments of the population (Table 2). The “lessons” var-
iables were uncorrelated with education and income, thus not 
varying between social classes. Gender was also found to be 
uncorrelated with the “lessons” variables. Older people tended 
to support both sets more, possibly due to an age-cycle effect, 
cohort effect, or both. Religiosity was negatively correlated with 
universalist but not particularist “lessons.” The only variable 
negatively correlated with universalist “lessons” and positively 
correlated with particularistic “lessons” was a rightist political 
stance. These findings support the notion that the “lessons” of 
the Holocaust are held diversely across ideological—but not 
socio-demographic—lines.  
  Table 1: Exploratory factor analysis of universalist and particularist “lessons” (Study 1) 
Item     Factor 1  Factor 2 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that Jews can rely only on themselves.       .053    .855 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that a strong Israel is necessary to protect the Jews.       .121    .808 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that the Jews have to be strong and to protect themselves.       .119    .893 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that we cannot expect help from other countries in times of crises.      -.117    .713 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that Israel is obligated to help those that are persecuted.       .883    .003 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that Israel should condemn persecution of minorities.       .827    .075 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that Israel should help weak and persecuted nations.       .901   -.006 
The lesson of the Holocaust is that we should understand others’ suffering.       .808    .080 
Eigenvalues    3.15   2.51 
% variance accounted for        39%    31% 
Internal consistency    α = .87    α = .82 
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
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Table 3 presents the results of a hierarchical multiple regres-
sion analysis predicting endorsement of an exclusionist policy 
toward asylum seekers, constructed in order to examine the 
unique contributions of the universalist and particularist “les-
sons” of the Holocaust. Model 1 included religiosity, political 
affiliation, and age. Model 2 added key variables for explaining 
exclusionist attitudes (national identification and nationalism). 
Model 3 further covered the “lessons” variables. The universal-
ist “lessons” stance was negatively correlated and the particu-
larist “lessons” view positively correlated with exclusionist atti-
tudes. The “lessons” also exhibited the strongest associa-
tions—greater than key factors such as political affiliation, re-
ligiosity, and nationalism. Their 9.6% contribution to the reduc-
tion in the unexplained variance beyond Model 2 illustrates 
their importance for explaining attitudes toward asylum seek-
ers.  
In a final model, not shown in Table 3, we additionally ana-
lyzed potential interactions by including as predictors the prod-
uct terms between universalist and particularist “lessons” on 
the one hand, and religiosity and political affiliation on the  
other. None of the interaction effects turned out to be signifi-
cant, all p > .29.  
 
Overall, the findings show that Jewish-Israeli particularist and 
universalist views of the “lessons” of the Holocaust impact at-
titudes toward asylum seekers. In line with the findings of Liu 
et al. (2014) regarding the role of collective memory, these 
perspectives play a role over and above both religious/secular 
and left/right divides and other key factors such as national-
ism. Support for universalist “lessons” was clearly negatively 
correlated with exclusionist attitudes. Support for particularist 
“lessons” was clearly positively correlated with exclusionist at-
titudes.  
 
5. Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c: The Dissimilar Effects of the 
Representation of the Holocaust upon Attitudes toward 
Asylum Seekers—Experimental Studies 
In Study 1, we examined respondents’ a priori perception of 
the “lessons” of the Holocaust via a cross-sectional survey de-
sign, focusing on the way in which people’s pre-existing under-
standing of the Holocaust was related to their attitude toward 
asylum seekers. Despite controlling for other variables, the de-
sign of Study 1 did not allow us to test any causal influences 
of representations of the Holocaust on attitudes. It was thus 
Table 2. Correlations between universalist and  
particularist “lessons” and background variables  
(Study 1) 
  Particularist   Universalist 
Gender  
   (0=male; 1=female)   -.061    .005 
Education    .024    .087 
Income     .000   -.008 
Age    .258***    .198*** 
Religiosity    .050   -.178*** 
Political affiliation (right)    .221***   -.246*** 
Note: N = 500  
 
Table 3. Predictions of exclusionist attitudes toward 
asylum seekers (Study 1) 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Age -.038 -.052  -.075 
Religiosity   .109*  .056   .073 
Political affiliation (right)  .416***  .343***   .198** 
National identification   -.105*  -.117** 
Nationalism    .284***   .217*** 
    
Universalist lesson     -.303*** 
Particularist lesson      .222*** 
R²   .229  .281   .377 
Note: N = 500. Table entries are standardized beta coefficients. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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followed up by Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c adopting an experi-
mental design to investigate whether exposure to different rep-
resentations of the Holocaust (particularist/universalist) would 
change attitudes toward asylum seekers. 
 
5.1. Study 2a: The Effect of Exposure to Framings of the 
Holocaust upon Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers—
Between-subjects Design 
5.1.1. Participants and Design 
As in Study 1, participants were recruited via an online panel 
and completed an online questionnaire in exchange for a sum 
equivalent to US $2 (N = 298; 51.3% women; mean age 42; 
18% born outside Israel; 51.5% secular; 35.3% high-school 
education or less). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions (described below): (a) universalist repre-
sentation (n = 96), (b) particularist representation (n = 98), 
and (c) a control condition (n = 104). No significant socio-
demographic differences obtained between the three condi-
tions. The respondents were informed that participation was 
anonymous and given the researcher’s contact details in case 
of queries. 
 
5.1.2. Procedure and Pilot Studies 
As the primary goal was to examine whether exposure to par-
ticularist/universalist representations of the Holocaust would 
affect attitudes toward asylum seekers, the manipulations 
were constructed as texts reflecting these framings. In order to 
distinguish between historical representations and current 
events, the manipulation refrained from referring to the “les-
sons” to be drawn from the Holocaust, restricting itself to un-
contaminated representations of the Holocaust in school text-
books. A rather weak manipulation was chosen in order to 
avoid evoking strong emotional reactions. In contrast to other 
studies investigating inclusive/exclusive representations of the 
Holocaust—which, examining respondents’ reactions on the 
basis of open questions, sought to evoke their emotional re-
sponse to the description of the Holocaust as a “crime against 
humanity” or a “crime against Jews” (Canetti et al. 2018; 
Hirschberger et al. 2017)—our focus lay on analyzing represen-
tations of the Holocaust per se. Participants were asked to read 
a text taken from a school textbook on the Holocaust; those in 
the control condition read a neutral text about computer stud-
ies. All participants were informed that they would be asked a 
number of questions afterwards.  
The universalist manipulation text was entitled: “Genocide: 
Not Just for Jews,” and ran as follows: 
The annihilation of the Jews during the Holocaust is not a 
unique event in history. During WWII, the Nazis decimated 
other groups in Europe, such as the Romani and Poles. Since 
the Second World War, there have been other cases of geno-
cide, such as Rwanda and Darfur. In fact, genocide is more 
characteristic of humanity than we like to admit. Researchers 
estimate that more than 100 million people have been killed 
in genocides during the twentieth century alone. 
The particularist manipulation text was entitled “The Holo-
caust: A Unique Event in Human History,” and ran as follows: 
The annihilation of Jews during the Holocaust is a unique 
historical event. Although the Nazis acted abominably toward 
other people, only the Jews were subject to systematic elimi-
nation. While ethnic oppression is common in history, the scale 
of the Holocaust and number of victims is unprecedented and 
unparalleled. The extermination of a third of the Jewish people 
is unique and exceptional in history. The Holocaust is also con-
sidered unique due to the deadly use of technology for the in-
dustrial liquidation of Jews in the death camps. Researchers 
agree today that the Holocaust is a unique historical event. 
Two pilot studies were conducted in order to examine the 
framing manipulation. In the first, the texts were randomly as-
signed to a sample of Jewish-Israeli students (N = 85; 54% 
women; mean age 25; 75% secular). Participants were asked 
to read the text and then write a sentence summing up what 
pupils would understand from the text in order to verify that 
their interpretations were in line with the manipulation. Analy-
sis of these sentences demonstrated the intended difference 
between the universalist and particularist framings. Pilot par-
ticipants also answered three items addressing universalist vs. 
particularist representations: “The Holocaust was not a unique 
event”; “Other nations have experienced similar events to the 
Holocaust”; and “Other nations have been victims of genocide” 
(scale from 1= strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree; α = 
.80). As intended, the mean in the universalist condition was 
higher (M = 6.03; SD = .96; n = 44) than in the particularist 
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condition (M = 3.71; SD = 1.52; n = 41), as indicated by a t-
test, t (83) = 8.425, p < .001. Additional analyses using items 
from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, 
and Tellegen 1988) showed that that the manipulations did 
not affect participants’ feelings, all p > .28.   
In the second pilot study, we adopted a within-/between-
subjects design based on an online survey (N = 230; 49% 
women; mean age 42; 67% secular; 31% high-school educa-
tion or less). Participants first answered the brief three-item 
scale measuring universalist vs. particularist understandings of 
the Holocaust described above. They were then asked about 
issues unrelated to the topic, such as their TV watching and 
internet usage habits. At this point, they read one of the ma-
nipulation texts and answered a series of descriptive questions 
to verify that they had understood it. Finally, they again an-
swered the universalist interpretation scale they had com-
pleted at the beginning of the questionnaire (α = .69 pre; α = 
.73 post). In the universalist condition (n = 100), the univer-
salist framing scale was found to be significantly lower in the 
pre- (M = 4.34; SD = 1.54) than the post-assessment (M = 
4.89; SD = 1.67), t (99) = -3.77, p < .001. In the particular-
istic condition (n = 130), however, it was significantly lower in 
the post- (M = 3.80; SD = 1.65) than in the pre-assessment 
(M = 4.25; SD = 1.56), t (129) = 4.65, p < .001. Overall, the 
pilot studies supported the validity of the manipulations as re-
flecting universalist and particularist representations of the 
Holocaust and had no effect upon emotional responses.  
The control group of Study 2a was given a text related to 
school computer studies. Although identical in length and 
structure to the historical texts, it was unrelated to the Holo-
caust or any political issues. The attitudes toward asylum seek-
ers exhibited by this group were thus unaffected by any histor-
ical framing. Prior to the reading of the texts, the manipulation 
groups were asked four questions relating to the importance of 
learning about the Holocaust in school in order to anchor their 
awareness. After reading the text, all three groups were asked 
five informational questions about what they had read. 
 
5.1.3. Instruments 
The scale assessing exclusionist attitudes consisted of the 
following items: “Israel should deport asylum seekers”; “Israel 
should not accept asylum requests”; “Israel should be gener-
ous to asylum seekers” (reverse coding); “While their requests 
are being considered, asylum seekers should have the right to 
work” (reverse coding). The response scale went from 1 = 
strongly disagree, to 6 = strongly agree. The items loaded on a 
single factor that accounted for 67% of the variance (α = .83).  
Religiosity was measured by respondents’ self-identification 
as secular, traditional, religious, or Ultra-Orthodox. These cat-
egories not being ordinal, a dichotomous variable was con-
structed to distinguish between secular (coded 0; 51.5%) and 
religious (traditional, religious, or Ultra-Orthodox; coded 1; 
48.5%) respondents (Moore and Aweiss 2002). 
 
5.1.4. Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the impact of the 
manipulations on attitudes toward asylum seekers revealed a 
framing-condition effect, F (2,295) = 3.12, p = .046. A fo-
cused comparison of the differences between the conditions 
for endorsing exclusionist policy revealed a significantly lower 
mean in the universalist (M = 3.54; SD = 1.44; n = 96) than 
in the control condition (M = 4.02; SD = 1.39, n = 104), t 
(198) = -2.38, p = .018. No significant difference obtained 
between the universalist and particularist conditions, t (192) = 
-.77, p = .440, however. The difference between the particu-
larist (M = 3.70; SD = 1.33; n = 98) and control conditions (M 
= 4.02; SD = 1.39; n = 104) was marginally significant, t (200) 
= -1.69, p = .092. Overall, while those in the universalist con-
dition exhibited less exclusionist attitudes toward asylum seek-
ers than those in the control condition, the effect was moder-
ate, explaining approximately 7% of the variance. While the 
particularist condition was also found to reduce exclusionist 
attitudes, this effect emerged only as a trend. The first conclu-
sion is thus that exposure to the universalist framing reduced 
exclusionist attitudes to a limited extent. This did not hold true 
for the particularist condition.  
In the next step, we sought to discover whether the effects of 
the experimental conditions were moderated by religiosity. To 
do so, we conducted a 3 (framing condition) x 2 (religiosity) 
ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of religiosity, F (1,291) = 
32.84, p < .001, which was much stronger than the main ef-
fect of experimental condition, F (2,291) = 3.602, p = .028. 
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Large differences obtained amongst the religious and secular 
respondents across experimental conditions (universalist: sec-
ular M = 3.05 / religious M = 4.07; particularist: secular M = 
3.13 / religious M = 4.20; control: secular M = 3.76 / religious 
M = 4.32); the interaction effect of condition and religiosity 
was not significant, F (2,291) = 1.33, p = .322. 
 
5.2. Study 2b: Replication of the Representation Effect—
Within/between-subjects Design 
To validate the effects of the way in which the Holocaust is 
framed found in the study 2a, we replicated the study using a 
within/between design, measuring the manipulation effects 
upon the same respondents. This type of design eliminates 
subject variance in the error terms used to test treatment ef-
fects. 
 
5.2.1. Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants (N = 280; 51% women; mean age 42; 63% sec-
ular; 29% high-school education or less) were recruited in the 
same way as in Study 2a. They were randomly assigned to ei-
ther a universalist (n = 145) or a particularist condition (n = 
135). Participants’ endorsement of exclusionist policies to-
ward asylum seekers was assessed with the same items as in 
Study 2a, both before (α = .78) and after exposure to the Hol-
ocaust texts (α = .83). Between the first assessment and ex-
posure to the text, in order to reduce potential sensitization 
effects, participants were asked several questions unrelated to 
the topic, such as their TV watching and internet usage habits. 
 
5.2.2. Results 
In line with the previous findings, participants exposed to the 
universalist framing endorsed exclusionist policies toward asy-
lum seekers less in the post-treatment (M = 3.20; SD = 1.40) 
than in the pre-treatment assessment (M = 3.37; SD = 1.35), 
t (144) = 2.01, p = .038. Exposure to the particularist framing 
did not impact exclusionist attitudes, however; the post-treat-
ment scores in this case were also lower (M = 3.22; SD = 1.46) 
than the pre-treatment scores (M = 3.31; SD = 1.40), but the 
difference was not significant, t (134) = 1.58, p = .115. 
 
5.3. Study 2c: The Effect of the Universalist 
Representation upon Attitudes toward Treating Wounded 
Syrians in Israeli Hospitals—Between-subjects Design 
The public discourse regarding asylum seekers in Israel fre-
quently adduces the Holocaust lessons. The results of Studies 
2a and 2b may reflect this fact, thereby undermining the gen-
eralizability of the findings. Our universalist text explicitly re-
ferred to other examples of genocide in Africa, thus potentially 
impacting the dependent variable measured in this study—at-
titudes toward asylum seekers who, in the Israeli context, are 
primarily from Sudan and Eritrea. An alternative dependent 
variable was therefore introduced to address these issues.  
Study 2c investigated whether the universalist framing of the 
Holocaust affected attitudes toward an issue that is similar, 
but not related to Africa. Since the end of 2013, more than 
three thousand people wounded in the civil war in Syria have 
received medical treatment in Israeli hospitals. While Israel 
does not grant these patients asylum, the medical treatment 
they receive may reflect the principle of helping others in need. 
Israel and Syria being technically at war, this is a highly unu-
sual case, constituting a type of “medical asylum.” The de-
pendent variable adopted was thus opposition to the treat-
ment of wounded Syrians in Israeli hospitals. In light of the fact 
that the findings of Studies 2a and 2b indicate that dissimilar 
representations of the Holocaust exert no distinctive effects, 
Study 2c focused exclusively on the universalist manipulation.   
 
5.3.1. Participants and Design 
Participants (N = 320; 50% women; mean age 41; 45% sec-
ular; 34% high-school education or less) were recruited in the 
same fashion as in Study 2a and randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions—the universalist framing manipulation (n = 
158) or a control group (as described in Study 2a; n = 162). 
No significant differences in socio-demographic variables ob-
tained between the conditions. 
 
5.3.2 Instruments 
After participants had read the Holocaust text or the control 
text, opposition to the treatment of wounded Syrians in Israeli 
hospitals was measured on a five-item Likert scale (response 
options from 1 = strongly disagree, to 6 = strongly agree): “No 
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need exists to provide treatment to wounded Syrians in Israeli 
hospitals”; “Taking care of wounded Syrians is a waste of 
money”; “Hospitals should take care of Israelis not Syrians”; 
“The treatment of wounded Syrians should stop immediately”; 
and “Wounded Syrians should be expelled to Syria.” The items 
loaded on a single factor that accounted for 73% of the vari-
ance (α = .90). In order to test whether effects of the experi-
mental manipulation may be moderated by religiosity or polit-
ical affiliation, these two variables were also measured. Relig-
iosity was measured as in Study 2a. Political affiliation was 
measured by the following item: “There is much talk about left 
and right in politics. Where would you rank yourself along a 
left-right continuum, when 10 is the right end, 0 is the left end 
and 5 is the center.” 
 
5.3.3. Results 
Opposition to treating wounded Syrians was found to be sig-
nificantly lower (M = 2.63; SD = 1.41) in the universalist than 
in the control condition (M = 2.96; SD = 1.45), t (318) = -
2.074, p = 0.039. The universalist manipulation thus ap-
peared to operate in a similar fashion as in Studies 2a and 2b, 
with support for treating wounded Syrians greater in the uni-
versalist condition than in the control condition. Additional 
multiple regression analyses revealed that neither religiosity 
nor political affiliation exhibited any significant interaction ef-
fects with experimental condition, both p > .55. 
 
6. General Discussion 
In September 2014, a Yazidi named Elias Qasim attending 
a conference in Tel Aviv asked: “Have we forgotten the Holo-
caust? … You experienced genocide and at the moment we’re 
experiencing genocide. Let’s remember what happened in the 
’30’s and ’40s when the world shut its eyes …” (Ynet News, 
September 11, 2014). Hereby, he adduced a universalist rep-
resentation of the Holocaust in order to foster sympathy 
amongst Israelis for the Yazidis under threat from the “Islamic 
State” in Iraq. This study looked at the way in which such ap-
peals to history can change attitudes and mobilize support. 
Specifically, we analyzed whether Israeli Jews draw universalist 
or particularist “lessons” from the Holocaust and whether ex-
posure to universalist and particularist representations of the 
event influenced their attitudes toward asylum seekers diver-
gently.  
In Study 1, we examined the extent to which Israeli Jews’ 
universalist or particularist beliefs regarding the “lessons” to 
be drawn from the Holocaust were correlated with exclusionist 
views toward asylum seekers from Africa. We found that sup-
port for universalist “lessons” was negatively correlated with 
exclusionist attitudes, while support for particularist “lessons” 
was strongly positively correlated with such views. These “les-
sons” were associated with attitudes toward asylum seekers 
even when political attitudes, nationalism, national identifica-
tion, and religiosity were controlled for. In other words, these 
perceptions held beyond alternative explanations.  
While these results demonstrate the relevance of a priori be-
liefs regarding the “lessons” to be drawn from the Holocaust, 
they do not indicate whether differential representations of his-
torical events causally  impact attitudes. In Study 2—which took 
the form of three survey experiments (Studies 2a, 2b, and 
2c)—we sought to determine whether exposure to universalist 
versus particularist representations of the Holocaust impacted 
attitudes independently of respondents’ a priori  beliefs regard-
ing the “lessons” that should be drawn from the Holocaust. The 
results indicate that a universalist representation of the Holo-
caust reduced negative attitudes toward asylum seekers and 
increased support for treating wounded Syrians in Israeli hos-
pitals. A particularistic framing did not heighten negative atti-
tudes toward asylum seekers. These effects did not interact 
with either religious identification or political affiliation.  
Overall, our research thus showed that while a priori beliefs 
in universalist and particularist Holocaust “lessons” were 
linked to attitudes in opposite ways beyond alternative expla-
nations, exposure to variant representations of the Holocaust 
did not have opposite effects. Although a universalist framing 
reduced exclusionary attitudes, a particularist framing did not 
heighten them. In fact, the particularist framing effect ran in 
the same direction as the universalist framing effect in Studies 
2a and 2b. Here, however, it was not significant.  
These results must be interpreted within the framework of the 
studies’ caveats. While the validity of the manipulation em-
ployed in Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c had been ascertained in a 
pilot test, the similar effect of the particularist and universalist 
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conditions calls for a deeper examination of the precise mech-
anism involved. Further development of alternative manipula-
tions is required in future studies. The specific context of the 
Holocaust and its profound presence in collective memory 
must also be explored in other settings.  
The findings clearly indicate that remembering the past af-
fects attitudes toward contemporary issues, which is con-
sistent with previous studies on collective memory, and 
memory of the Holocaust in particular. None of the latter, how-
ever, has examined the differences between a priori  “lessons” 
from historical events and exposure to dissimilar representa-
tion of the events. The a priori  “lessons” reflect the common 
social understanding of a historical event, forming part of what 
Hilton and Liu (2008) refer to as a nation’s “historical charter.” 
The findings of Study 1 clearly demonstrate that Israeli Jews 
believe that both universalist (the obligation to be neither per-
petrator nor passive bystander) and particularist (self-reliance 
and skepticism of universal norms) “lessons” should be drawn 
from the Holocaust. These a priori  perceptions are closely cor-
related with attitudes toward asylum seekers beyond alterna-
tive explanations. The representations presented in texts in 
Study 2 differed from “lessons” in reflecting one specific fram-
ing of historical events rather than people’s pre-existing per-
ceptions of them. 
While particularist a priori  perceptions were more closely as-
sociated with more exclusionist attitudes, particularist framing 
manipulations did not cause more exclusionist attitudes. At the 
same time, universalist “lessons” and exposure to universalist 
representations both reduced exclusionist views. What ac-
counts for these dissimilar findings? One explanation relates 
to the social context of the studies. Although the pilot study 
provided clear support for a dissimilar understanding of the 
universalist and particularist framing amongst respondents, 
the effect of the particularist framing on their attitudes may 
have been limited by the fact that this accords with the domi-
nant Israeli “historical charter” pertaining to the Holocaust. As 
Hilton and Liu (2017, 300) argue, historical charters “explain 
and legitimize a group’s current political settlement, facilitate 
self-enhancing group categorizations, and structure political 
debate and justify collective courses of action.” The Israeli his-
torical charter of the Holocaust is predominantly formulated in 
particularist terms that help the country justify its policies and 
actions and protect itself against criticism (Zertal 2005). Is-
rael’s exclusionist policy toward asylum seekers being closely 
aligned with this charter, the respondents’ reaction to the par-
ticularistic framing condition may thus have been restricted be-
cause it felt quite natural to them. The universalist condition, 
in contrast, may have been far less obvious to them—thus hav-
ing a greater impact upon their attitudes. Beyond this possible 
contextual explanation, psychological explanations might also 
account for the differences. Additional studies are needed to 
further develop the distinction between a priori perceptions of 
historical events and effects of messages conveying different 
representations.  
What are the broader implications of these findings? The way 
in which issues such as asylum are framed is crucial for the 
way in which political actors seek to legitimize policies. Studies 
of the representation of immigration in Western Europe distin-
guish between the nationalist approach, which focuses upon 
maintaining national boundaries, and the moral-universalist 
view, which champions human rights (Helbing 2014). When a 
frame or interpretive scheme is adopted in order to enhance a 
specific reading of history, its objective is to impact the way in 
which the subject is perceived. The German President’s 2015 
speech, for example, framed the post-WWII German refugee 
crisis in universalist terms, representing the current refugee cri-
sis as a human rights issue. The findings of our current re-
search suggest that this stratagem may be of rather limited 
value. While people’s existing perceptions of historical events 
appear to be strongly associated with their attitudes, divergent 
framing may only have a partial effect. The ability to mobilize 
a specific reading of history in order to affect views toward ref-
ugees or immigrants may thus be rather less effective than 
might be assumed. 
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Appendix. Additional scales used in Study 1 
 
Variable Item Range 
Age Age (years)  
Gender Male/female 0–1 
Education What is your formal education?  1–6 
SES What is your family average income?  1–6 
Religiosity How religious are you?  
0 = Secular  
1= traditional, reli-
gious, ultra-orthodox 
Political identification What is your political affiliation?  1–5 
National identification 
 
 I identify with Israel 
 Israel is an important part of my identity 
 The Israeli identity is important for me more than any 
other identity 




 The world would be a better place if people from other 
countries were more like Israelis 
 Generally speaking, Israel is a better country than most 
other countries 
 In comparison with other nations, Israel is very moral na-
tion 
 Other countries can learn a lot from Israel
1–7 
 
